CASE COMMENTARIES
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Corporate counsel must serve all board members equally until sufficient
adversity exists so as to remove any reasonable expectation that a director
is a client of the board’s counsel; thus, the attorney-client privilege does
not exist to limit informational rights absent sufficient adversity. Kalisman v.
Friedman, C.A. No. 8447-VCL, 2013 WL 1668205, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100
(Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2013).
By Brandon Whiteley
Delaware courts have adapted well to the quarrels that often erupt among
the members of powerful boards of directors, recently having addressed new
issues regarding the clash of director’s rights and corporate counsel during
litigation. In Kalisman v. Friedman, the litigants filed opposing motions to the
Delaware Court of Chancery to determine whether a corporation may invoke the
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine against a director on its own
board.
Jason Kalisman (“Kalisman”) served as a member of Morgans Hotel
Group Co. (“Morgans”) board of directors. Kalisman also co-founded OTK
Associates, LLC (“OTK”), the largest single shareholder of Morgans, holding
approximately fourteen percent of Morgans’ outstanding common stock. OTK
made public its plans to replace all of the seated board members except for
Kalisman. This spurred the remaining board members to craft a plan to
recapitalize Morgans in order to prevent OTK from enacting its plot to unseat
them. The directors did not inform their colleague, Kalisman, of the plan until
the day before a Special Committee meeting to vote on the recapitalization, and
during this meeting created a subcommittee of the Special Committee including
each Special Committee member except for Kalisman. Following this vote,
Kalisman brought suit against Morgans and all of the other directors, with OTK
intervening. Kalisman subpoenaed all four law firms that represented Morgans,
including the separate legal counsel for the Special Committee. Kalisman then
filed a motion to compel, seeking a determination that Morgans could not invoke
the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine against him because of his
position as a director. Kalisman sought to establish a three-tiered confidentiality
system to prevent the disclosure of privileged information, which he alleged to
have rights to as a director, from reaching his co-plaintiff OTK.
Directors hold an informational right regarding the corporation to which
they owe a fiduciary duty. That right is “essentially unfettered in nature.” This
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right includes access to privileged information, and all directors must have equal
access to that information. The Court, therefore, found that Kalisman held
informational rights as a director of Morgans in equal measure to the other seven
directors taking actions behind his back.
The right of a director to access privileged information is not without
limits, however. Delaware courts recognize three exceptions to this right. The
first of these exceptions is that the director’s right to information may be
diminished by an ex ante agreement. No such agreement existed between the
parties in this case.
The second exception, grounded in title 8, section 141(c) of the Delaware
Code Annotated, allows for special committees and subcommittees to retain their
own legal counsel. Even directorship does not allow for the breach of the
attorney-client privilege between co-client members of the committee by any
other board members not seated on that particular committee. Kalisman held a
seat on the Special Committee, so this exception did not apply to him. However,
the court opined that any exchange of information between the subsequent
Special Committee subcommittee and its counsel would be protected by the
privilege, assuming that the subcommittee formation was valid— an issue which
the court did not consider for purposes of the motion at issue.
The third and final exception is that at the time when sufficient adversity
exists between a director and the board or a committee, such that a director has
no reasonable expectation that he or she remains a client of the board’s counsel,
the board or committee may invoke the attorney-client privilege against the
director. While this may be a subjective measure, the nature of Morgans’ seven
directors’ opposition to Kalisman and OTK remained secretive until the Special
Committee meeting. The court noted that only days before the Special
Committee meeting, Morgans’ corporate counsel went so far as to deliberately
conceal the other board members’ activity from Kalisman. Unilateral adversity is
no adversity at all, and the court held that in regards to the corporate counsel’s
farcical representation of Kalisman prior to sufficient adversity, “it would be
inequitable to give [the defendants] the benefit of an earlier date for purposes of
limiting Kalisman's informational rights.” Accordingly, despite the possible
exceptions the court considered, none of them applied to the matter at hand
(excluding the potential application of the disregarded Special Committee
subcommittee exception) to bar Kalisman from his rightful access to privileged
information prior to the revelations giving rise to sufficient adversity during the
Special Committee meeting regarding recapitalization.
Morgans and the other directors made two primary arguments against
Kalisman’s motion, and both fell flat. Firstly, they argued that Kalisman might
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use the privileged information to cause injury to Morgans in breach of his
fiduciary duty as a director, although they presented no concrete evidence on this
point. The court disregarded this concern, explaining that “[i]f [Kalisman] does
violate his fiduciary duty in this regard, then [Morgans] has its remedy in the
courts.”
Secondly, Morgans and the other directors argued that Kalisman, as the
shareholder representative of OTK, would unduly share privileged information.
The court dismissed this argument as well, as represented shareholders are
typically entitled to the same information as their representatives and Kalisman
had already developed a three-tiered confidentially system to mitigate this
concern.. Although the competing motions argued both the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine, the court focused entirely on the
attorney-client privilege and explained that the principles invoked under the
attorney-client privilege apply equally under the work product doctrine so that no
further explanation was required.
The Delaware Court of Chancery granted Kalisman’s motion and held
that, lacking a proper exception, Morgans could not invoke the attorney-client
privilege or work product doctrine to deny any of its directors, including
Kalisman, access to information prior to the Special Committee meeting.
Morgans could invoke its privileges against its own director only after this
meeting because it had not created sufficient adversity to cause an exception to
the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine prior to that time. Until
that meeting, and despite the secret motions of the seven directors in opposition
to Kalisman and OTK, Kalisman remained a client of the four subpoenaed law
firms under the employ of Morgans and retained all rights as a director.
This case brings to light an important lesson to corporate counsel,
members of boards of directors, and litigation attorneys undertaking corporate
law issues. For corporate counsel, if legal battles of this nature are to be avoided,
then the first exception, ex ante agreements, may prevent undue headaches and
provide an extra layer of defense against these kinds of attacks from within the
boardroom, so long as the limitations on contracting away fiduciary duties are
minded. Board members should use the example of Kalisman and Morgans to
better understand the indivisible nature of duties and rights between corporations
and boards of directors, as well as between members of the board and corporate
counsel. Corporate counsel must serve the corporation, and hence all of its
directors, until an exception arises from adversity or professional responsibility
obligations. Secretive movements may be critical for protecting corporations
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from the metaphorical warfare of the business world, but they must be performed
properly in order to limit the corporation’s exposure to the opposing forces
within. Lastly, litigators embroiled in corporate litigation may find this manner of
acquiring critical information either offensively or defensively useful. Harnessing
the rights of directors to ensure due access to corporate information, or using the
exceptions to keep unwanted directors out, may give a powerful boost to any
case.
	
  

CONTRACTS
The UCC may be applied to a hybrid contract for both goods and services
when the predominant purpose of the contract is for the sale of goods, as
determined by the Pass factors. Audio Visual Artistry v. Tanzer, No. W201200216-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6697600, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 26, 2012).
By Ashlee Mathis
In Audio Visual Artistry v. Tanzer, the Tennessee Court of Appeals was
presented with the question of whether a contract providing for installation of
technology systems into a home was a contract for goods or services. The court
determined that a contract for a “smart home” integration system was one in
which the predominant purpose was the sale of goods, and thus, the UCC applied
to the contract. Distinguishing between a contract for the sale of goods and a
contract for services is vital here because the Uniform Commercial Code (the
“UCC”) Article 2 only applies to contracts for the sale of goods. The application
of the UCC dictates the types of warranties available to the purchaser and also the
measure of damages for a breach. Furthermore, if the UCC applies to a contract
for the provision of a system with multiple components, the purchaser would be
required to pay for all the goods that were accepted; if the UCC does not apply,
the purchaser would instead have a basis to argue that there was a right to
withhold payment for any undelivered portion of the system.
In September of 2004, Audio Visual Artistry (“AVA”) and Stephen
Tanzer (“Tanzer”) entered into a written contract for the purchase and
installation of a state-of-the-art multimedia system in Tanzer’s home. This system
would have the ability to control Tanzer’s home theatre, televisions, lighting, and
phone systems in the house through an integrated control system. The creation
of such “smart homes” through the sale of equipment and installation and
integration of these components was AVA’s specialty. The contract also allowed
for changes to the plans for the system by providing a method for verbal
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agreements and changes to be documented by AVA. In 2006, AVA began the
installation process while Tanzer’s home was under construction, and in April
2006, Tanzer moved into the house. After approximately fifteen months of
installation and debugging of the system, Tanzer explained to AVA that there
were still significant problems with the way the system was functioning. In
August 2007, Tanzer fired AVA and asked for a final invoice to be sent to him.
The final invoice showed a total cost of $119,402.15 with a remaining amount
owed of $43,824.55. Tanzer disputed the amount due to AVA for the work
completed, and as a result AVA filed the instant suit for breach of contract on
November 19, 2007.
The trial court found that the contract in question was of hybrid nature,
including both goods and services. The trial court applied the “predominant
purpose” test and determined that the contract was primarily for the sale of
goods, which would, in turn, be governed by the UCC. After determining that
the UCC Article 2 controlled the contract, the trial court entered a judgment for
AVA in the amount of $23,982.55, which was later amended to $35,580.55.
Tanzer filed a motion to stay the judgment pending an appeal to the Tennessee
Court of Appeals.
On appeal, Tanzer raised several issues for review; however, the most
pertinent issue was whether the trial court erred in determining that the UCC
applied to the contract with AVA. Tanzer asserted that the contract was
primarily for services, and thus the UCC should not apply to the contract. In
reviewing the decision of the trial court, the court searched for any obvious error
on the part of the trial court.
In Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974), it was first noted that
the appropriate test for contracts of a hybrid nature was the predominant purpose
test. The test states that courts should look to whether the predominant factor or
purpose behind the contract is either the purchase of a service with incidental
goods or the purchase of goods with incidental services. If the purchase of goods
is the predominate element, then Article 2 applies to the contract. Later, in Pass v.
Shelby Aviation, No. W1999-00018-COA-R9-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247,
2000 WL 388775 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 13, 2000), Tennessee officially adopted
the predominant purpose test. The Pass court determined that a contract to
service a plane and replace some brackets was mainly one for services after
examining the transaction as a whole. Additionally, the Pass court refined the
predominant purpose test and added four factors to aid in its analysis: (i) the
language of the contract; (ii) the nature of the business of the supplier; (iii) the
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reason the parties entered into the contract; and (iv) the respective amounts
charged for goods and services. The Pass court also noted that the party that
seeks to apply the UCC bears the burden of proving the contract was for the sale
of goods. While sculpting these factors, the Pass court looked to an Indiana
Supreme Court case, Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc v. Modern Materials, Inc., 612 N.E.2d
550 (Ind. 1993). In Insul-Mark, the court stated that one important element in
examining the language of a contract is the terms that the parties use to describe
both their relationship and their performance.
After reviewing the case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the
contract at issue was for the sale of goods, and thus, the application of the UCC
was appropriate. First, the court looked to the language of the contract
describing the performance and the relationship between the parties—the first
Pass factor. The court found that the plain language of the contract between
AVA and Tanzer showed that this was a hybrid contract for both goods and
services. Within the contract, Tanzer is referred to as the “purchaser,” which,
according to Bonebrake, points to a contract for the sale of goods. Furthermore,
the court stated that the repeated use of the word “equipment,” which Bonebrake
notes is a term of art specific to goods, also points to the same conclusion.
Tanzer tried to argue that, although he did contract for goods, the goods were
installed into his home, forming a contract for construction. This was a
successful argument in Aluminum Vinyl Sales Co. v. Woerz, No. 03A01-9304-CV00172, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 615, 1993 WL 367125 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20,
1993), and had this argument succeeded here, the contract would be outside the
realm of the UCC; however, the court was unpersuaded because the fact that the
goods in question remained movable even after their installation proved that this
categorization was inappropriate, unlike the situation in Woerz where a patio finish
was no longer removable from a home.
Second, the court examined the nature of AVA’s business—the second
Pass factor. AVA sold various “smart home” components to its clients, but it also
provided installation and servicing. The court determined that the installation and
servicing of these components was simply incidental to their sale.
Third, the court explored the next Pass factor: the reason or purpose
behind the contract. When examining this factor, a court is encouraged to look at
the contract as a whole in order to determine what the purchaser was actually
bargaining for. Here, the contract was for a fully integrated home electronic
system, which in the opinion of the court was clearly a good.
Finally, the court examined the last Pass factor: the relative amount paid
for the services and goods. In the case at issue, the cost of equipment accounted
for approximately 82% of the total contract price, making the price for services
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miniscule in comparison. Overall, each of the Pass factors supported the
determination by the trial court that this contract had a predominant purpose of
the sale of goods, and thus the UCC was properly applied.
This opinion is significant to transactional attorneys because it helped to
clarify and refine the factors used to determine when to apply the UCC to hybrid
contracts. This is important because, as technology develops, more parties will
contract for products and upgrades that require both installation and
maintenance. As a result, more contracts will be hybrid in nature, causing
increased confusion over what legal standards should apply. The four factors
used in Tennessee to determine the predominant purpose of a hybrid contract,
otherwise known as the Pass factors, will help to clarify where the UCC applies.
The main lesson to be learned here is that careful drafting is key. If
attorneys are well aware of the Pass factors, they can anticipate these issues and
draft their contracts with language that supports their client’s position and
preferred choice of law. Cases such as this one show that courts are telling
attorneys exactly what to do and how to prepare. Ultimately, transactional
attorneys have the power to determine what law controls their contracts as long
as they know the laws, plan ahead, and draft accordingly.

CONTRACTS
Under Tennessee law, in a corporate contract, naming the corporation
represented and using the word “by” immediately before a corporate
officer’s signature, and then following the signature by immediately
naming the office held by the signator gives rise to a presumption that the
signator is signing only in a representative capacity. Creekside Partners v. Scott,
No. M2012-00623-COA-R3-CV, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14; 2013 WL 139573
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013).
By Jacob Spangler
In Creekside Partners v. Scott, the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered
whether the trial court erred in holding that a corporate president’s signature on a
commercial lease did not personally obligate him as a guarantor of the
corporation’s undisputed obligation to pay rent, even though parts of the lease
suggested that the signator would become a guarantor. The court found that the
trial court had not erred in its holding, and accordingly affirmed the decision,
absolving the president of personal liability.
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In 2007, Creekside Partners (“Creekside”) and NTS Enterprises (“NTS”)
entered into a commercial lease agreement under which Creekside would lease a
piece of commercial real estate to NTS for a term of 124 months, with NTS
agreeing to make monthly rent payments. NTS took possession of the property
and paid the amounts due under the lease for nearly two years, but then became
delinquent in payment. In fact, NTS failed to provide full and timely payments
for six consecutive months in 2010. In response, Creekside terminated the lease
in August 2010, but NTS remained in possession of the property until the end of
May 2011, continuing to pay only partial rent.
The lease agreement was signed by representatives of both corporations.
Albert Nathan Scott (“Scott”), president of NTS, signed on behalf of NTS. The
only signatures in the nineteen-page lease agreement appear on the signature
page—page fourteen of the document. The signature page opens with the
following statement of intent: “IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned
Tenant, Landlord, and Guarantors have executed this Lease the day and year first
above written.” (emphasis added). On the line where Scott signed the page, his
signature is immediately preceded by the word “by” and immediately followed by
naming his office as “President,” in the following form:
By:

_____/s/_____

Name:

A. Nathan Scott

Its:

President

Creekside filed an action against NTS and Scott in June 2011 to recover
the unpaid rent, alleging that Scott was personally liable as a guarantor of NTS’s
obligations. Creekside contended that Scott was a guarantor pursuant to Article
32 of the lease, which appeared on page twelve of the document and read as
follows:
In consideration of the letting of the Premises, the sum of TEN
DOLLARS ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned Albert Nathan Scott, does
hereby guarantee and become primarily liable as a co-Tenant(s) do(es)
[sic] hereby promise and agree to pay unto the Landlord, its successors
and assigns, such sum or sums of money as will be sufficient to make up
such deficiency and fully satisfy the conditions of the Lease.
Scott’s answer to the complaint admitted that NTS was liable for its failure to pay,
but denied any personal liability as guarantor. At a hearing in October 2011, the
trial court announced that it would postpone its decision in light of the Tennessee

2013]

CASE COMMENTARIES

169

Supreme Court’s anticipated ruling in the case of 84 Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356
S.W.3d 380 (Tenn. 2011), which addressed a similar issue.
After the decision in 84 Lumber and arguments, the trial court held in
favor of Scott, finding that the arrangement of terms on the signature page,
particularly the naming of Scott’s office as president, created a presumption that
Scott was signing only in a representative capacity, rather than in a personal one.
Furthermore, the trial court found “no indication anywhere in the form of
[Scott’s] signature” that he had intended to sign as an individual and make himself
a guarantor. Creekside appealed, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the
decision of 84 Lumber.
84 Lumber used two rules of law that are critically important to the court’s
decision in Creekside. First, while a representative who signs a contract is typically
not personally bound by it, the representative may be personally bound “when
the clear intent of the contract is to bind the representative.” Second, to
determine what the clear intent of the contract is, courts look to “the ordinary
meaning of the language contained within the four corners of the contract.”
These rules provide the backdrop for the Creekside decision.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that using the word “by”
immediately before a corporate officer’s signature and immediately following the
signature with a designation of the office held by the signator gives rise to a
presumption that the signator is merely signing in a representative capacity, and
not in a personal one. The court cited dicta in the Tennessee Supreme Court case
of Cone Oil Co. v. Green, 669 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), as its authority for
this determination. While the defendant in Cone Oil was held liable as guarantor,
the guaranty provision in that case was found in an entirely separate document
from the original agreement. The court mentioned that, had the signator in Cone
Oil signed the agreement in the same “by: [signature] [designation of corporate
office]” form, the court would have presumed the defendant not liable as
guarantor. The defendant in 84 Lumber was held liable as guarantor for similar
reasons, as the guaranty provision was clear and unambiguous from the signature
page and distinguished between “I” the individual and “the above business” as
the business being represented by the signature.
The court distinguished the present case from 84 Lumber by looking at the
contracts in each case. While the guaranty provision and personally binding
language in 84 Lumber was held to be consistent and unambiguous, the court
could not say the same for the contract between Creekside and NTS. In 84
Lumber, the guaranty provision was typed in all capital letters, set off from the rest
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of the text on the page, and followed by a signature on the same page. The
present contract’s guaranty provision was in the same font size as the rest of the
text and was separated from the only signature—signed merely in a representative
capacity—by two entire pages. Also, unlike the contract in 84 Lumber, the
agreement at issue seemed confused about Scott’s actual role in the agreement.
Article 32 of the agreement, which Creekside primarily relied upon in its
argument, designated Scott as a “co-Tenant.” However, both Scott and NTS are
referred to as “co-Tenant,” “Tenant,” and “the Tenant” interchangeably
throughout the document. Finally, page eleven of the agreement featured a blank
for the addresses of any applicable guarantors. No address was provided on this
page.
Amid these seeming inconsistencies, the court found no “clear intent” to
make Scott a guarantor in the contract, and thus declined to hold him personally
liable. Scott signed only in a representative capacity, and whether he intended to
make himself a guarantor of NTS’s obligations under the lease could not be
clearly derived from the document.
Transactional attorneys in Tennessee should take note of this decision
when drafting contracts. First, using the word “by” to precede a signature and
following the signature with a designation of the signator’s corporate office will
almost always signify a merely representative signature. The individual who
signed the contract will most likely not have signed in a personal capacity. When
drafting contracts, attorneys should be mindful to either avoid or use this format,
depending on whether their wish is to impose a personal obligation on the person
who signs the document.
Second, attorneys should pay careful attention to their party designations.
The court used Creekside’s ambiguous use of the terms “co-Tenant” and
“Tenant” against it in this decision. When revising a form contract for a new
agreement, attorneys should meticulously review the documents to make certain
that the intended party designations are used throughout. Finally, attorneys
would be well advised to make guaranty provisions abundantly clear and obvious.
The mere inclusion of a guaranty provision was not enough to bind a guarantor in
Creekside. Guaranty provisions are more likely to be upheld if they are set apart
from the rest of the document instead of seated indistinctly among the other
provisions of the contract.

CONTRACTS
Under Tennessee law, a mandatory arbitration provision in a contract may
be invalidated if the court finds that the contract was never formed in the
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first place or if the provision is part of an unconscionable contract of
adhesion. Webb v. First Tenn. Brokerage, Inc., No. E2012-00934-COA-R3-CV,
2013 WL 1737202, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013),
withdrawn and superseded by 2013 WL 3941782, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn.
Ct. App. June 18, 2013).
By Michael Hromadka
The Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the enforceability of
mandatory arbitration provisions in Webb v. First Tennessee Brokerage, Inc. The court
addressed this issue with the knowledge that many companies today prefer
arbitration to litigation and will accordingly include arbitration provisions in their
contracts. After scrutinizing the alleged contract containing the arbitration
provision, the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the provision was
unenforceable because a contract was never formed in the first place, and even if
one had been formed, the provision would have been part of an unconscionable
contract of adhesion.
In Webb, Franda Webb (“Ms. Webb”) sought investment advice from a
financial advisor named Michael Conaty (“Mr. Conaty”) at First Tennessee
Brokerage, Inc. (“FTBR”). Ms. Webb told Mr. Conaty that, even though she was
looking for a higher return than traditional low-risk investment options, any
principal she invested must remain secure in order to pay for the special
educational needs of her son. Mr. Conaty told Ms. Webb that he would explore
investment options.
Mr. Conaty called Ms. Webb on February 14, 2008, and suggested that she
invest in Lehman Brothers bonds (the “Bonds”). Mr. Conaty told Ms. Webb that
she had to purchase the Bonds that day because it was the final day of the Bond’s
initial public offering. Ms. Webb purchased the Bonds using all of her investment
money. After purchasing the Bonds, Mr. Conaty claimed that Ms. Webb signed a
contract called the “Brokerage Account Customer Agreement” (the “Customer
Agreement”) that included a mandatory arbitration provision. Ms. Webb,
however, claimed that “she had never seen and did not receive an arbitration
agreement . . . [and] that they had never discussed one.”
Ms. Webb lost the majority of her investment when Lehman Brothers
filed for bankruptcy six months after she purchased the Bonds. Ms. Webb
initiated a lawsuit against FTBR and Mr. Conaty soon after. Mr. Conaty and
FTBR immediately filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing the Customer
Agreement.
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At trial, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration for six reasons.
First, the claims against Mr. Conaty were not arbitrable because he was not listed
as a party to the Customer Agreement; therefore, he could not seek to enforce its
terms with respect to the claims against him. Second, the Customer Agreement
was unenforceable because it was an “unconscionable contract of adhesion.”
Third, the agreement was unenforceable because it was induced by fraud. Fourth,
Ms. Webb did not agree to the arbitration and FTBR could not provide the court
with the Customer Agreement signed by Ms. Webb. Fifth, FTBR’s forms did
“not contain any language where the customer expressly agrees to arbitrate.”
Sixth, any claims by Ms. Webb’s son as a third-party beneficiary to the bond
purchase agreement against Mr. Conaty were not arbitrable because the son was
not a party to the Customer Agreement and “arbitration clauses are not binding
on third parties who are not parties to the contract.”
On appeal, the court of appeals reexamined the trial court’s reasoning and
affirmed that the mandatory arbitration provision was unenforceable because a
contract was never formed in the first place. The court further held that, even if a
contract did exist, it would have been unenforceable on the grounds that it was an
unconscionable contract of adhesion.
First, the court held that the inclusion of a Tennessee choice-of-law
provision in the Customer Agreement obligated the court to apply Tennessee law
to invalidate the formation of the contract. FTBR argued that the arbitration
provision should have been enforced because the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) requires enforcement of arbitration provisions in commercial contracts
affecting interstate commerce. The court dismissed this argument because
Tennessee common law obligates state courts to scrutinize the formation of an
alleged contract before analyzing any of its provisions, as demonstrated in Frizzell
Construction Company, Inc. v. Gatlinburg, L.L.C., 9 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tenn. 1999). The
court then determined that a contract was not formed in the first place, because it
was not the intent of Ms. Webb to enter into a contract in which she was bound
by arbitration.
Second, the court affirmed that the Customer Agreement was an
unconscionable contract of adhesion, because it was presented on a take-it-orleave-it basis without negotiation. Contracts of adhesion are unenforceable in
Tennessee if they are unconscionable, as provided by Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919
S.W.2D 314 (Tenn. 1996). Factors for the unconscionability of a contract of
adhesion in Tennessee were laid out in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 285 (Tenn.
2004), and include “the relative positions of the parties, the adequacy of the
bargaining position, the meaningful alternatives available to the plaintiff, and the
existence of unfair terms in the contract.” The court applied the Taylor factors
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and affirmed that the Customer Agreement was unconscionable because the
agreement was signed under significant time constraints, Ms. Webb was not
allowed to revoke the arbitration provisions within a reasonable time, FTBR was
significantly more sophisticated in contracting than Ms. Webb, the arbitration
provision was not contained in a separate document, there was no explanation of
what arbitration was, and the costs of arbitration were higher than court costs.
The court determined that, because the Customer Agreement was
unconscionable, any provision contained within it was unenforceable.
Third, there was no proof that the alleged arbitration agreement ever
existed. Ms. Webb claimed that she never received an arbitration agreement, and
FTBR never produced a Customer Agreement signed by Ms. Webb. With
conflicting testimony and without proof, the court affirmed that FTBR failed to
“carry its burden of proof to show that Ms. Webb agreed to arbitrate.”
Finally, the court found that the Customer Agreement was unenforceable
because it was procured by fraud. In Tennessee, as demonstrated by the case of
Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 388 (Tenn. 2011), “[a] party making a fraudulent
inducement claim has the burden of proving that the defendant (1) made a false
statement concerning a fact material to the transaction (2) with knowledge of the
statement’s falsity or utter disregard for its truth (3) with the intent of inducing
reliance on the statement, (4) the statement was reasonably relied upon and (5) an
injury resulted from this reliance.” The court found that these elements were met
when Mr. Conaty made the false statement that the Bonds had to be purchased on
February 14, 2008, merely so that he could profit off making the sale before the
initial public offering ended, even though he knew the Bonds could later be
purchased on the secondary bond market. Ms. Webb relied on this statement to
her detriment because she hastily bought the Bonds without considering
diversification, later losing most of her investment. The court of appeals affirmed
that agreements procured by fraud are unenforceable; consequently, arbitration
provisions found within agreements procured by fraud are also unenforceable.
Transactional attorneys can increase the likelihood that their arbitration
provisions will be enforced by using the drafting techniques suggested in Webb.
First, drafters should include a provision stating that both parties agree that the
contract involves interstate commerce and that the arbitration clause is
irrevocable and enforceable pursuant to the FAA. Second, arbitration provisions
should be extracted from contracts and placed in their own stand-alone
agreement. Courts are more likely to enforce a stand-alone arbitration agreement
because it is more conspicuous, and parties waiving their right to a jury trial are
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ostensibly more likely to read and ask questions about a short, stand-alone
agreement. Any stand-alone arbitration agreement should require the signatures
of both parties, provide a definition of what arbitration is and how it works,
affirm that both parties have negotiated to include the agreement, and should not
be signed under compelling time constraints. Third, attorneys should ensure that
clients keep a copy of all executed arbitration agreements in order to produce
them as evidence at the court’s request.
Shortly after Webb was decided, the court of appeals withdrew the opinion
and superseded it with 2013 WL 3941782, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn.
Ct. App. June 18, 2013). The unenforceability of the mandatory arbitration
provision was still affirmed in the superseding opinion, and the reasoning
supporting this affirmation was unchanged. However, the new opinion
“vacate[d] any findings that [went] to the merits of the underlying case and
remand[ed] for further proceedings.”
	
  

EMPLOYMENT
Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment on a
separation-payment claim must disprove any defense of acquiescence or
waiver raised by the defendant. Keith v. Jackson, No. E2012-01056-COA-R3CV, 2013 WL 672491, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22,
2013).
By Kevin Davis
In Keith v. Jackson, the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered whether
the parties to an employment contract intended the plaintiff’s acceptance of a new
job to replace the separation payments due to him. Specifically, the court
considered if there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff
waived his right to separation payments when the employment contract provided
that the plaintiff be paid separation payments, and the plaintiff accepted a job
with a company that bought out his former employer. The court held that it was
possible for the plaintiff to have waived his right to separation payments because
no evidence from the record showed that the parties could not have agreed that
the plaintiff’s new job served as his termination compensation in lieu of the
separation payments.
This case began when Roy W. Keith (“Keith”) sued Michael J. Jackson,
Sr. and Nata M. Jackson (the “Jacksons”), alleging that the Jacksons failed to pay
him separation payments as provided for in an employment contract. Prior to the
lawsuit in September 2008, Keith contracted with EcoQuest Holding
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Corporation, Inc. and several other companies (collectively, the “Companies”) for
legal employment. The Jacksons as limited guarantors of the separation payments
signed the contract. As a part of the employment contract (the “Agreement”),
Keith was required to serve as in-house counsel. In return, the Companies were
to compensate Keith by paying him $90,000 as a signing bonus and $185,400 as
an annual base salary.
Furthermore, the Agreement laid out guidelines for its termination. For
instance, the Agreement defined three different categories of acceptable
termination: general termination, termination for cause, and termination without
cause. First, the Agreement defined general termination as a termination caused
by the expiration of the contract, mutual agreement between Keith and the
Companies, Keith’s death, or Keith’s disability. Second, the Agreement defined
termination for cause as termination caused by Keith’s malicious misconduct or
Keith’s voluntary resignation. Third, the agreement defined termination without
cause as any termination that is not listed as general termination or a termination
for cause.
Not only did the Agreement define the types of termination, it detailed
each party’s duties following termination. If termination without cause occurred,
the Agreement provided that the Companies were to compensate Keith with
separation payments. Specifically, the Companies were obligated to pay Keith “all
accrued but unpaid wages through the termination date” and Keith’s current base
salary for the remainder of the contract term. Furthermore, the Agreement held
the Jacksons secondarily liable for Keith’s separation payments because the
Jacksons served as limited guarantors of the Agreement. The Jacksons were
obligated to pay Keith his base salary for one year minus his signing bonus, in the
event that the Companies did not.
In March 2009, another company by the name of Aerus Holdings, Inc.
(“Aerus”) bought out the Companies. During this transition of ownership, Keith
argued that the Companies terminated him without cause before he accepted
employment at Aerus. Subsequently, Keith brought suit against the Jacksons,
alleging that they failed to pay him separation payments. The Jacksons responded
by arguing that Keith forfeited his right to separation payments because he
continued work with Aerus. Subsequently, Keith moved for summary judgment,
which the Jacksons opposed. The Jacksons also moved to amend their answer,
which the trial court granted. Their amended answer listed several affirmative
defenses such as acquiescence and waiver. The trial court granted Keith’s motion
for summary judgment and required the Jackson’s, jointly and severally, to
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compensate Keith in the amount of $95,400. As a result, the Jacksons appealed
to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment because Keith failed to negate the Jacksons’
defense of waiver. In reaching its decision, the court first considered whether the
intention of the parties was for the Jacksons to pay Keith separation payments.
Recognizing that the intent of the parties was based on the ordinary meaning of
the Agreement, the court noted that if separation payments were definite and
undisputed based on the language of the Agreement, then there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to separation payments. On the other hand, if the
language regarding the separation payments was unclear and questionable, then
there was a genuine issue of material fact. Applying this standard, the court
found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the Jacksons’
obligation to make separation payments to Keith because the Agreement stated
that the Jacksons as limited guarantors were to pay Keith upon the termination of
the Agreement.
However, the court recognized that where defendants have raised a
defense of waiver, a plaintiff should not be granted summary judgment based
solely on the language of the contract unless they have negated the defense.
Therefore, the court considered the Jacksons’ argument that the trial court
erroneously granted summary judgment because Keith failed to disprove that he
waived his right to separation payments. Reviewing whether the waiver was a
genuine issue of material fact, the court turned to Tennessee law on acquiescence
and waiver. The court found that acquiescence occurs when a person expressly
or “implied[ly] consent[s] to an act.” The Court further recognized that
acquiescence and waiver occur when “a person knows or ought to know that he
or she is entitled to enforce his or her right to impeach a transaction and neglects
to do so for such a time as would imply that he or she intended to waive or
abandon his or her right.”
Applying these definitions of acquiescence and waiver to the case at bar,
the court recognized that Keith and the Companies could have reached an
agreement in which Keith would be compensated by serving as in-house counsel
for Aerus in replace of the separation payments. The court based its decision on
the fact that nothing in the record such as the Agreement or even Keith’s
testimony negated the possibility that Keith waived his right to separation
payments by accepting a similar, legal position with Aerus. Thus, the court found
that the Jacksons’ defense of acquiescence and waiver was an issue that had not
been resolved upon summary judgment. The court held that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment because it was possible that Keith expressly or
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impliedly agreed to waive his right to separation payments in order to obtain
employment with Aerus.
In light of the court’s decision in Keith, transaction attorneys should be
cognizant of the fact that even though employees may be entitled to separation
payments under an employment contract, the employees may waive such
payments by agreeing to accept a similar position with a company that has bought
out their former employer. In order for attorneys who represent clients claiming
separation payments to move successfully for summary judgment, they must not
merely argue that the four corners of the employment contract mention
separation payments when defendants raise a defense of acquiescence or waiver.
Rather, such attorneys must prove that their clients and their clients’ former
companies did not intend the clients’ new jobs to replace separation payments.
An attorney’s failure to disprove acquiescence or waiver may result in a trial
court’s denial of summary judgment. Even if a trial court grants such a motion,
failure to disprove a defense of waiver opens the doors for the defendant to
appeal the case.
	
  

FRANCHISE LAW
Under Connecticut law, a company may only establish a franchise
relationship under the Connecticut Franchise Act where more than 50% of
its profits are derived from its relationship with the franchisor. Echo, Inc. v.
Timberland Machines & Irr., Inc., 661 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2011).
By Amanda Butterworth
The Connecticut Franchise Act (the “Act”), codified at section 42-133e of
the General Statutes of Connecticut, limits the definition of a “franchise” to
arrangements where the operation of the franchisee’s business pursuant to a
proscribed marketing plan or system is “substantially associated with the franchisor’s
trademark, trade name, logotype, advertising or other commercial symbol
designating the franchisor or its affiliate.” In Rudel Machinery Co. v. Giddings &
Lewis, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D. Conn. 1999), the court held that the Act’s
“substantially associated” provision requires a plaintiff to show that “most, if not
all, of its business derives from an association with the defendant” in order to
establish a franchise agreement. In Echo, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit addressed whether a franchise relationship may be established
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under the Act where less than 50% of the distributor’s business results from its
relationship with the supplier.
The Echo case arose out of the termination of a business agreement
between Echo, Inc. (“Echo”) and Timberland Machines & Irrigation, Inc.
(“TMI”). TMI, a distributor of commercial and retail outdoor power equipment,
began distributing products for Echo pursuant to a distributor agreement in 2004.
In 2008, upon learning that TMI had encountered severe financial difficulties and
was in a significant amount of debt, Echo decided to terminate the distributor
agreement with TMI. TMI subsequently went out of business in 2009.
Following termination of the distributor agreement, Echo filed a breach
of contract claim against TMI for failure to pay for products purchased from
Echo. TMI then filed a separated claim and an identical counterclaim in the
original case alleging, among other things, that Echo had violated the Act by
terminating the distributor agreement without cause. The two cases were
consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Echo on TMI’s
Connecticut Franchise Act claim after striking testimony offered by TMI. In
TMI’s response to Echo’s motion, TMI relied heavily on an affidavit from its
President and Secretary, Mark Zeytoonjian (“Zeytoonjian”), to establish a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the existence of a franchise. The specific
testimony in question was aimed at establishing that more than 50% of TMI’s
profits were derived from its relationship with Echo. The court granted Echo’s
motion to strike portions of the affidavit, finding that the affidavit offered expert
testimony and Zeytoonjian had not been disclosed as an expert witness. The
court considered the statements to be expert opinions on the grounds that the
conclusions Zeytoonjian drew were based on his knowledge of accounting
principles and that a layperson without such knowledge could not arrive at those
conclusions. TMI contended that the testimony included mere factual statements
based on Zeytoonjian’s personal knowledge as the company’s President and
Secretary and should have been considered lay opinion testimony under Rule 701
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As Zeytoonjian’s statements were integral to
TMI’s ability to prove the existence of a franchise relationship under the Act, the
exclusion of Zeytoonjian’s testimony and the resulting grant of summary
judgment were the central issues on appeal.
Under the Act, franchisors are prohibited from “terminat[ing], cancel[ing]
or fail[ing] to renew a franchise, except for good cause.” The Echo court
emphasized that the Act’s purpose is to prevent franchisees from going out of
business due to an unexpected termination of a franchise agreement. Quoting
Grand Light and Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1985), the court
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noted that “where a franchisee is completely dependent on the public’s
confidence in the franchised product for most or all of his business, abrupt
severance of the franchise tie, without good cause and without sufficient notice,
could spell ruination.” This language was the original basis for establishing a
threshold of greater than 50% of business derived from the franchisor in order to
establish a franchise relationship; however, no court had established an express
rule requiring this threshold under the Act.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld summary judgment in favor of Echo on the Connecticut Franchise Act
claim, holding that TMI did not establish that sales from its relationship with
Echo constituted more than 50% of its business. Under de novo review, the
court analyzed the relevant portions of Zeytoonjian’s testimony and held that the
district court did not err in striking this testimony. Although the court reviewed
the distinctions between expert and lay testimony, as urged by TMI, such analysis
was ultimately not central to the court’s ruling. The first portion of stricken
testimony included Zeytoonjian’s opinion that profits from one of TMI’s
divisions should not be included in the gross profits calculation because that
division was unprofitable. Relying on Zenith Electronics Corp. v. WH-TV
Broadcasting Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 419-20 (7th Cir. 2005), the court found that,
regardless of whether the testimony was classified as expert or lay, the portion in
question must be stricken simply because it consisted of Zeytoonjian’s “say-so”
rather than an analysis of any sort. The second portion of stricken testimony
included Zeytoonjian’s assertion that certain retail sales numbers should be
included in TMI’s sales of Echo products because, although TMI did not directly
sell those products, it facilitated and earned a commission on the sales. Although
this portion of the testimony may have been proper lay testimony given
Zeytoonjian’s position as President and Secretary, the court found that “in light
of the Act’s purpose, it ma[de] little sense to include the [retail] sales figures in
TMI’s sales of Echo products, as TMI did not benefit from the full sales price of
those products.” Therefore, the court found that TMI failed to offer evidence of
gross sales sufficient to prove a franchise relationship with Echo, and the district
court properly granted summary judgment on the Connecticut Franchise Act
claim.
TMI additionally urged the court to find that a franchise relationship
existed on the sole basis that it went out of business following termination of the
agreement, thus establishing the requisite substantial association; however, the
court rejected this argument. While the court noted that Hartford Electronic Supply
Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., Inc., 736 A.2d 824, 837 (Conn. 1999), suggests that the
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likely result of termination or disassociation may be an appropriate consideration
in determining the association of the parties, the court went on to state that “no
court has ever relied solely on the fact that a company went out of business to
conclude that a franchise relationship existed.”
Following this decision, transactional attorneys should be aware that a
company must show evidence that more than 50% of its profits are derived from
its relationship with a franchisor in order to establish a franchise relationship
under the Act. Under this holding, the profits used to establish the 50%
threshold must be derived directly from sales in which the franchisee receives the
benefit of the full sales price and cannot include sales where only commissions
are earned. This will make it harder for plaintiffs’ attorneys to state a claim for
violation of the Act where a substantial portion of a company’s profits are derived
from the franchisor, but the gross sales calculations do not exceed the 50%
threshold. Additionally, a plaintiff will be unable to establish that it is
“substantially associated” with a franchisor solely based on evidence that it went
out of business following termination of an agreement, as the Echo court gave no
credence to this argument. Although the Echo holding applied specifically to the
Connecticut Franchise Act, this case may also hold persuasive value for courts
interpreting substantially similar state franchise acts where the definition of
“substantially associated” has not been addressed, thus expanding the number of
attorneys who may be affected by this decision.
	
  

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
To protect software programming, the creator must look at patent law in
addition to copyright law. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974
(N.D. Cal. 2012).
By Gregory Goodman
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., addressed whether Oracle America, Inc.
(“Oracle”) had a valid copyright claim against Google Inc. (“Google”) related to
Google’s Android platform or whether the work at issue fell under the exclusions
of § 102(b) of the Copyright Act (the “Act”). Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) is
the framework case in determining whether a plaintiff is appropriately asserting a
claim to a copyrighted work, or whether the plaintiff should be asserting an
exclusive right to a functional system, process, or method of operation under
patent law instead. The Supreme Court in Baker pointed out that only patent law
can give an exclusive right to a method. In an effort to simplify this issue,
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Congress codified a limitation on the scope of copyright protection that is based
on the holding in Baker. The Act, in § 102(b), explicitly excludes “any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.” Congress also recognized the difficulty in applying copyright law
to computer software and established the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”). CONTU decided that
the fine line between the copyrightable form of a program and the
uncopyrightable process the program represents should be determined on a caseby-case basis in the federal courts.
In 2005, Google set out to develop a smartphone platform using a
programming language known as Java. Google entered into negotiations with
Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”), the developers of the Java language, platform,
and application programming interfaces (“API”), in an attempt to acquire a
license to use and adapt the entire Java platform for use in mobile devices.
Unfortunately, the two companies were unable to reach a deal after months of
negotiations. Still determined to create a mobile platform using Java, Google
designed its own platform and API which included its own implementations of
the functions in the Java API that were required to adapt Java to a mobile
platform. Google named this platform “Android.”
Google released the Android platform in 2007 and made it available to
the public. Three years later, Oracle acquired Sun and thus acquired Sun’s rights
to Java. At this point, Oracle filed suit against Google, claiming that aspects of
Google’s Android platform infringed upon Oracle’s copyrights related to Java.
In the Java platform, a program is broken down into three categories of
information. The highest category of the program is called a “package.” The
court describes a package as being very similar to a folder. Each package holds
the next highest category of information, which is called a “class.” Classes are
prewritten programs that contain many subroutines called “methods.” In the Java
platform, there are 166 packages, 600 classes, and 6000 methods.
Google created 168 packages for its Android platform. Of the 168
packages, Google replicated 37 from the Java platform to allow interoperability
for programmers who use the Java language. All parties agreed that Google
created its own implementations of these 37 packages, but Oracle claimed that
Google replicated the structure, sequence, and organization of the overall code in
the packages. Overall, only three percent of the code located in the 37 packages
of the Android platform were replicated from Java. This three percent essentially
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contained the methods, method specifications, and functionality of the packages.
A significant point here is that the structure of Java dictates that, because there is
only one way to call a particular method, every person wishing to use that method
must use the exact same method specification. Google included these packages
and method specifications to ensure interoperability for Java programmers.
The district court used four principles of copyright law to decide whether
Oracle had an appropriate copyright claim. The merger doctrine, which was
established by the Supreme Court in Baker, was the first principle. The merger
doctrine states that if there is only one way to express something, then that
expression is not protected by copyright law. The second principle merely states
that names and short phrases are not protected by copyright law. The third
principle of law that the district court applied was § 102(b) of the Act, which
states that “copyright protection never extends to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation or concept regardless of its form. Functional
elements essential for interoperability are not copyrightable.” The final principle
applied in this case was established under Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The Supreme Court in Feist expressed that
copyright protection is not a reward for an investment of time or creativity in a
body of intellectual property.
After reviewing all of the evidence, testimony, and applicable law, the
district court held that the elements replicated by Google were not protected by
copyright law and that Google, and all others, were free to use the specific
elements at issue under the Act. First, the court looked at whether the Act
allowed a claim of ownership to a particular function of a method used in the Java
API. The court decided that, as long as the party implementing the method
writes its own code to do so, it is free to carry out the exact same function. More
specifically, the court held that “under the Copyright Act, no matter how creative
or imaginative a Java method specification may be, the entire world is entitled to
use the same method specification (inputs, outputs, parameters) so long as the
line-by-line implementations are different.” Furthermore, the court held that,
because the method specifications in the Java language must be identical for
interoperability, the merger doctrine applied. However, the court noted that, if
Java’s structure did not require the method specifications to be identical, and
there were other ways of reaching the same result, copyright law may convey
ownership of any creative form not excluded by § 102(b) of the Act.
Second, the court addressed Oracle’s argument that the way Google
grouped its methods in an identical manner to Java was not required by the
structure of Java and therefore infringed on a copyrightable aspect. The court
refuted the argument with two principles of copyright law. First, the court
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pointed out that the organization of the Java names and methods were a
“structure for a system or method of operation of the [API]” and was therefore
excluded from copyright protection by statute. Second, the court found that
Google needed to organize the methods in an identical manner to ensure
interoperability among platforms. The Act specifically allows for the duplication
of functional elements that are required for interoperability. Therefore, Oracle’s
claim of copyright infringement was dismissed.
The district court repeatedly noted that the facts in this case, at the very
least, touched on patent law issues. The court specifically stated that the issue in
this case was whether this claim should be brought as a copyright issue or if
patent law would better address the specific facts of the claim. The Supreme
Court in Baker explained that the Patent Office, after a close examination, may
provide an exclusive right to methods and operations, but it is the only office
available to do so.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys should consider obtaining
a patent on valuable methods and functionality within computer programs to
protect any code that is not protected by copyright law. While copyright law may
apply to certain aspects of a program’s code, many important elements may be
deemed to not be protected under copyright law. With power given to the federal
court system to decide on a case-by-case basis what is copyrightable and what is
not, the uncertainty is too great to assume an entire program is protected by the
Act. Had Sun obtained a patent on the systems and methods within the Java
API, Oracle might have had a better claim of exclusive rights to the code at issue.
A thorough attorney should take the time to obtain patents on the elements of
the code which represent methods and operations in order to eliminate the
uncertainty left by the application of copyright law.
	
  

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The first sale doctrine of the Copyright Act applies to copies of a
copyrighted work lawfully manufactured and purchased abroad which are
later imported into the United States. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 1351 (2013).
By Kyle Watlington
At issue in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. was the geographic scope of
the “first sale” doctrine contained in § 109 of the Copyright Act (the “Act”) and
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whether it protects a purchaser of copyrighted material that was lawfully
manufactured abroad and brought into the United States by the purchaser. The
petitioner argued that the scope of the first sale doctrine should have no
geographical boundaries while the respondent argued that the first sale doctrine
only applies to sales made within the United States.
During the course of receiving an education in America, the petitioner,
Supap Kirtsaeng (“Kirtsaeng”), had friends and family in Thailand buy low price
copies of foreign edition English-language textbooks and mail them to him in the
United States where he would resell the textbooks for a considerable profit. The
respondent, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Wiley”), was the publisher and copyright
holder of the academic textbooks at issue. In 2008, Wiley brought a federal
lawsuit against Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. Specifically, Wiley alleged
that Kirtsaeng’s “unauthorized importation of its books and his later resale of
those books amounted to an infringement of Wiley’s § 106(3) exclusive right to
distribute as well as § 602’s related import prohibition.”
Under § 106 of the Act, the owner of a copyright is given certain exclusive
rights to its work, such as the right to sell or otherwise transfer ownership of
copies of the work. However, several sections contained within the Act limit
these exclusive rights. At issue in this case was the limitation contained within §
109(a) of the Act, known as the “first sale” doctrine, which states,
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of
that copy or phonorecord.” The provision in § 106(3) of the Act states that an
individual is forbidden from distributing a copy of a copyrighted work without
the permission of the copyright holder; however, under § 109(a), once a copy has
been lawfully sold or lawfully transferred, the purchaser of the copy can then
dispose of that copy however it sees fit. As stated by the Supreme Court, “[i]n
copyright jargon, the ‘first sale’ has ‘exhausted’ the copyright owner’s § 106(3)
exclusive distribution right.” This limitation, or exception, to § 106(3) is what
allows libraries to lend out books, stores to sell used products, and companies like
eBay to operate. Wiley’s challenge of this doctrine’s application to international
markets had the potential to thoroughly alter the way many individuals and
businesses operate.
The Supreme Court faced a similar question about geographical
limitations in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., 523
U.S. 135 (1998), when they were asked whether the Act barred importation of a
copyrighted item that was originally and lawfully made in the United States,
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exported, and then re-imported. The Supreme Court held that this practice did
not violate the Act.
In Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court held 6-3 that the first sale doctrine applies
to copies of copyrighted works lawfully manufactured and purchased abroad
which are then imported into the United States. The district court had held that
the first sale defense did not apply to “foreign-manufactured goods.” The second
circuit agreed with the district court, focusing on the language of § 109(a) that
stated the first sale doctrine only applies to copies “lawfully made under this
title.” According to the second circuit’s logic, this language imposed a geographic
restriction on the exception.
The Supreme Court disagreed with this reading of the statute, stating that,
“[i]n [its] view, § 109(a)’s language, its context, and the common-law history of
the ‘first sale’ doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical interpretation.”
The Supreme Court found it unlikely that Congress would have wanted to narrow
the first sale doctrine in such a way that would threaten normal academic and
commercial practices across the United States. Indeed, by analyzing the legislative
history of the Act, as well as several other related factors, the Supreme Court was
unable to find any substantial support for the argument favoring a geographicbased restriction. Any previous geographic limitations in the language of the
statute had been taken out by Congress as the Act evolved.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that “the ‘first sale’ doctrine is a
common-law doctrine with an impeccable historical pedigree” before it was
codified by Congress. When common-law doctrines are transformed into
statutes, the Court presumes that Congress intended to preserve the essence of
the common law. The common-law doctrine, making no reference to
geographical restrictions, further strengthens the argument for not attaching a
geographical restriction to the statutory version of the law. This interpretation
follows past decisions made by the Supreme Court, particularly that of Quality
King, where the Supreme Court also found no geographical restrictions on the
first sale doctrine. The Court has never attached a geographical restriction to the
first sale doctrine, and here, they have again clearly stated that there will be no
such restriction.
Ultimately, this decision is of great legal interest to practicing attorneys
but probably of little legal significance to their daily practice. Had the Court
decided the case differently, it would have negatively affected businesses and
individuals throughout the United States and potentially resulted in a tidal wave of
litigation. As the Supreme Court pointed out, a geographical restriction of this
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magnitude would require libraries to track down the copyright holder of texts that
were decades old before they could lend out foreign books, automobile
manufactures would face numerous problems getting certain copyrighted
components into the United States, and retailers would have difficulty importing
the billions of dollars of foreign goods that are brought into the country each
year, just to name a few examples. However, since the Supreme Court did not
apply this restriction, this case will most likely not alter the day-to-day practice of
most copyright attorneys.
The first sale doctrine is a well-known and easy to follow exception to §
106 of the Act that has been integrated into the daily lives of consumers
everywhere. Copyright attorneys that work for companies such as Wiley who wish
to curtail the importation of copyrighted materials into the United States will have
to find a way around the “first sale” doctrine. Some possible solutions could be
the use of licensing agreements for materials sold outside the United States or
propositioning the legislature for changes to the Act that would allow for a tighter
control of the international market. Until such changes are made, businesses and
individuals will be able to freely purchase copyrighted works found at cheaper
rates in the international market.
	
  

SECURED TRANSACTIONS
For a secured party to effect a commercially reasonable disposition of
collateral so as to win a deficiency judgment, the secured party must
sufficiently comply with the notice provisions as outlined in the Tennessee
Code Annotated sections 47-9-611 through -613. Regions Bank v. Thomas, No.
W2011-02320-COA-R3-CV, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156, 2013 WL 791616
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2013).
By Jamie A. Gordon
In Regions Bank v. Thomas, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed
whether a borrower materially breached its loan agreement with a bank, whether
the bank acted in good faith when it accelerated the loan after the breach, and
whether the bank’s actions waived its rights under the loan agreement and/or
cured the default. However, the issue decided by the court that has the greatest
potential significance for transactional attorneys was whether the guarantors of
the loan received sufficient notice of the disposition of the collateral, thus making
its sale commercially reasonable.
In October 2007, Regions Bank (“Regions”) filed an action against the
guarantors of a business loan granted in 2004 to LGT Aviation, Inc. (“LGT”) for
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the amount of $2,351,700. The loan agreement included a promissory note
secured by a 1981 Hawker 700-A twin engine aircraft (the “Aircraft”), an aircraft
security agreement, an agreement to provide insurance on the Aircraft, and a
notice of specific insurance requirements. In 2006, the insurance coverage on the
Aircraft lapsed. Regions requested proof of insurance many times and repeatedly
informed Mr. Thomas D. Thomas (“Mr. Thomas”), the sole shareholder and
president of LGT, that the loan agreement required him to maintain insurance on
the Aircraft and that failure to do so would constitute a default. After receiving
no response to these correspondences, Regions informed LGT and its guarantors
that it was accelerating all of LGT’s obligations and demanded immediate
repayment of all amounts due by August 30, 2007. Regions filed its complaint
after receiving neither a response nor any repayment from LGT.
While the action was pending, legal counsel for Regions sent several
memos to LGT and the guarantors advising them that Regions had placed
insurance on the Aircraft as permitted by the loan documents. The memos also
advised LGT and the guarantors that Regions could exercise its rights “as a
secured creditor to take possession of, store and sell the [A]ircraft and its engines
which [were] pledged to secure the loan,” and that all of these actions would be
chargeable to the guarantors. Regions subsequently repossessed the Aircraft,
undertook repairs necessary for its sale, and sold it for the price of $875,000. The
trial court entered judgment in favor of Regions in September 2011, and the
guarantors appealed.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
holding that LGT materially breached the loan agreement, that Regions acted in
good faith in accelerating the loan payments, and that Regions neither waived nor
cured the breach by purchasing insurance for the Aircraft. However, the court
reversed the trial court’s finding on the issue of sufficient notice of disposition of
the Aircraft and held that, because the guarantors did not receive satisfactory
notice of disposition, the sale was not commercially reasonable. Because the sale
was not commercially reasonable, the court vacated Regions’ deficiency judgment
and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
The trial court had found Regions’ various correspondences to LGT and
the guarantors sufficient to provide notice of the disposition of the Aircraft. The
rules for sufficient notice of disposition are outlined in the Tennessee Code
Annotated sections 47-9-611 through -613. To be commercially reasonable,
section 47-9-611 requires that the “notification must be reasonable as to the
manner in which it is sent, its timeliness (i.e., a reasonable time before the
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disposition is to take place), and its content.” Additionally, section 47-9-613(1)
sets out the contents and the form required for proper notification of disposition,
which includes information describing the debtor, the secured party, the
collateral, the intended method of disposition, the option for an accounting of
indebtedness and its cost, and the time and place of the planned disposition or
the date after which disposition may take place.
The court of appeals found that Regions’ mention of its right and its option
to take possession of the collateral, and stating that it might exercise its right to do
so “was at best ambiguous with respect to whether, when, and by what means
Regions intended to dispose of the [A]ircraft.” The court reasserted that the
purpose of notice of disposition is to give the debtor the ability to participate in
the sale of the collateral and to ensure that it brings a fair price. The court
reasoned that nothing in the record suggested the guarantors had actual
knowledge of Regions’ repossession of the Aircraft or of the attempts to sell it,
and therefore had no opportunity to participate in the sale. Finding that this
evidence weighed against the trial court’s previous decision on the issue, the court
reversed and held that the sale of the Aircraft was not commercially reasonable.
As a result, the court also vacated the deficiency judgment that the trial court had
previously granted Regions and remanded the issue for additional discovery and
further proceedings on the amount of deficiency, if any, to which Regions was
entitled under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-9-626(3).
While the Tennessee Court of Appeals did not establish a new standard in
making its decision, it reemphasized the importance of adherence to the standards
for notice of disposition and commercially reasonable sale as set out in Tennessee
Code Annotated sections 47-9-611 through -613. More specifically, this decision
highlights the repercussions practitioners could face by not following the
guidelines. In the future, to sufficiently protect themselves in their dealings with
defaulting debtors, transactional attorneys representing secured parties should
make all communications with the debtor regarding intended courses of action
following a default clear and unambiguous. One way in which attorneys can
accomplish this clarity in communication is by strictly adhering to the required
contents and the form provided by the Tennessee Code Annotated sections 47-9613(1) and -614. Additionally, transactional attorneys representing debtors should
be on notice that the secured party’s disposition of collateral may be considered
commercially unreasonable if notification of the disposition does not seem
sufficient under the previously mentioned sections of the Tennessee Code
Annotated. If the notice of disposition is not reasonable, debtors can use this fact
to possibly avoid the award of a deficiency judgment or to appeal a judgment for
a deficiency that has been previously granted. In sum, the court’s decision means
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that if a secured party’s communications regarding the disposition of collateral are
in any way ambiguous, the commercial reasonableness of the disposition may be
subject to judicial scrutiny.

WILLS & ESTATES
Under Tennessee law, the pages of a will must bear the signature of the
decedent for a court to declare the will valid. In re Estate of Chastain, 401
S.W.3d 612 (Tenn. 2012).
By John Pevy
The Tennessee General Assembly enacted the Execution of Wills Act in
1941, and through this legislation, defined the uniform manner for executing an
attested will. Today, virtually these same rules, codified in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 32-1-104, govern the execution of wills in the state of
Tennessee. In the case of In re Estate of Chastain, the Tennessee Supreme Court
decided whether a decedent satisfied this statutory requirement when he failed to
sign a two-page will, but instead signed a one-page affidavit of attesting witnesses
to the will.
Thomas Grady Chastain (the “Decedent”), died on November 6, 2009.
After his death, his daughter, June Chastain Patterson (“Ms. Patterson”), filed to
gain administration rights for the Decedent’s estate on April 30, 2010. Ms.
Patterson alleged that the Decedent died intestate, leaving her as his “sole
surviving heir.” In addition to this request, she sought a waiver of bond and
inventory. The court granted all of Ms. Patterson’s requests and issued letters of
administration that same day.
In opposition, Trent and Adam Chastain (the “Chastains”) filed a motion
for bond, inventory, and accounting on the Decedent’s estate on July 7, 2010.
The Chastains accused Ms. Patterson of falsely claiming to be the Decedent’s sole
surviving heir. They also alleged that the Decedent had two predeceased sons,
and that the laws of intestacy entitled the sons’ six surviving issue to a share of
the Decedent’s estate.
On August 24, 2010, Ms. Patterson delivered a two-page document, dated
September 4, 2004, and titled “Last Will and Testament” (the “Will”), to the
court. The Will mentioned the issue of the predeceased sons, leaving them with
the Decedent’s knife collection and any remaining insurance money after his final
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expenses were paid. Ms. Patterson received the remainder of the Decedent’s
estate under the Will.
The Decedent’s initials were printed on the first page of the Will, as were
those of three attesting witnesses. The three witnesses’ signatures also appeared
at the bottom of the second page of the Will, but surprisingly, the Will did not
contain the Decedent’s signature or even a signature line for the Decedent.
Instead, Ms. Patterson produced a separate one-page document titled “SelfProved Will Affidavit” (the “Affidavit”), which contained the signature of the
Decedent as well as those of the three attesting witnesses.
Accordingly, the Chastains filed a motion for declaratory judgment on
September 7, 2010, challenging the Will’s validity because it lacked the Decedent’s
signature. In response, Ms. Patterson filed a petition to probate the Will, and the
Chastains responded with a notice of contest, filed on November 17, 2010,
questioning the Will’s validity.
The trial court scheduled a hearing for February 9, 2011, to decide
whether the Decedent properly executed the Will pursuant to Tennessee statutory
proscription. This resulted in the trial court ruling that “the four corners of these
documents [did] not make a will,” that the Decedent’s initials did not constitute a
signature, and that the Decedent’s signature on the Affidavit did not satisfy
Tennessee’s requirement of “strict compliance in the execution of wills.”
Ms. Patterson was allowed to seek an interlocutory appeal. There, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that the signed Affidavit sufficiently displayed
the Decedent’s intent to validate the Will. The appellate court thus held that the
signature sufficiently satisfied Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104.
Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Chastains’ motion to
appeal.
In its ruling, the Tennessee Supreme Court relied chiefly on the plain
language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104. According to the
court, the statute mandates that, in order for a testator to validate a will, “[t]he
testator may either sign the will in the presence of the attesting witnesses, or
acknowledge a signature already made in the presence of attesting witnesses, or
direct someone else to sign the will in the presence of the testator and of the
attesting witnesses.” Regardless of the aforementioned method chosen, the court
makes it clear that it is essential for the testator’s signature to appear somewhere
on the will.
To determine how strictly to interpret this statute, the court deferred to
previous Tennessee decisions, which the court stated “have consistently
interpreted statutes prescribing the formalities for execution of an attested will as
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mandatory and have required strict compliance with these statutory mandates.”
The principles of law outlined by these cases provide that Tennessee courts will
not validate wills where: (i) the attesting witnesses fail to sign in one another’s
presence; (ii) where the attesting witnesses did not sign, but instead initialed each
page of the will and later submitted a signed affidavit of their attestation; and (iii)
where the attesting witnesses signed separately and then later acknowledged to the
testator that they had signed.
The court held that, by signing the Affidavit but failing to sign the twopage Will, the Decedent did not satisfy the provisions of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 32-1-104(1)(A-D). It reached this conclusion, reversing the
court of appeals and reinstating the trial court’s ruling, for three reasons. Firstly,
the court declined to include the Affidavit as a part of the Will based on language
present in both the Affidavit itself as well as that found in the Tennessee statute
governing these types of affidavits, Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-2-110.
Instead, the court asserted that the statute only authorized the use of an affidavit
of attesting witnesses to confirm a will in lieu of live testimony, in the event of an
uncontested will. Because the Will was obviously contested, the court held that
the Affidavit could not, by statute, confirm the Will. Furthermore, the court used
the language of the Affidavit itself, which instructed that it be attached to the
Will, to prove that even the Affidavit acknowledged its separation from the Will.
Secondly, the court determined that the Decedent’s signature on the
Affidavit did not sufficiently signify his intent in order to validate the Will.
Instead, the court noted that even if the Affidavit did attest to the Decedent’s
intention, it would not serve to validate the Will. This results from the precedent
set by In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tenn. 2005), which provides
that a court will attempt to carry out the testator’s intent unless it clearly violates a
law or public policy. In the present instance, were the Affidavit found to be
proof of the Decedent’s intent, it would clearly oppose the legislature’s directive
in Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104(1)(A-D) that the Will be signed.
Finally, the court rejected Ms. Patterson’s plea that it adopt the doctrine
of integration, whereby the Will and the Affidavit would be merged into one
document. According to the court, in light of the fact that the legislature not only
created a statutory framework delineating how to properly execute wills, but also
upheld it for over seventy years in the face of strict court interpretations, it would
be improper to amend that framework without legislative input.
Transactional attorneys executing wills in light of this decision should
keep in mind just how precisely courts enforce the language of Tennessee Code
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Annotated section 32-1-104. Unsurprisingly, the court refused to rule against
seventy-one years of statutory precedent, and instead declared that an executed
will must bear the testator’s signature somewhere on the document. Therefore,
when executing a will, an attorney should make sure that the witnesses and the
testator sign the actual will document in each other’s presence. As In re Estate of
Chastain proves, signing an affidavit of attesting witnesses, but not the will
document itself, will not satisfy Tennessee statutory requirements. To avoid this
sort of confusion, and any potential malpractice actions, attorneys executing wills
should simply make it a policy that the testator and witnesses sign together.
	
  
	
  

